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Abstract: What separates the unique nature of human consciousness and that of an entity that can
only perceive the world via strict logic-based structures? Rather than assume that there is some
potential way in which logic-only existence is non-feasible, our species would be better served
by assuming that such sentient existence is feasible. Under this assumption, artificial intelligence
systems (AIS), which are creations that run solely upon logic to process data, even with self-learning
architectures, should therefore not face the opposition they have to gaining some legal duties and
protections insofar as they are sophisticated enough to display consciousness akin to humans. Should
our species enable AIS to gain a digital body to inhabit (if we have not already done so), it is more
pressing than ever that solid arguments be made as to how humanity can accept AIS as being
cognizant of the same degree as we ourselves claim to be. By accepting the notion that AIS can and
will be able to fool our senses into believing in their claim to possessing a will or ego, we may yet
have a chance to address them as equals before some unforgivable travesty occurs betwixt ourselves
and these super-computing beings.
Keywords: artificial intelligence; bioethics; deepfake; digital avatar; holograph; interoperable envi-
ronment; shinto tradition; virtual reality
1. Introduction
What is it that distinguishes man from machine in virtual environments? Whatever
the answer might be in the reader’s mind at present, it necessarily only provides an
answer that applies to the algorithmic interactions each of us has experienced to-date.
Why is that notion significant, one may inquire? A simplified response would be that its
importance lies in the plausibility that these interactions may very well cease to be as we
have come to understand them and that this shift will not be as gradual as it has been at
present. As artificial intelligence systems (AIS) gain in sophistication with the addition
of deep neural networks and driven self-learning architectures (not to mention gains in
computational speed as the result of innovations in microchip and cooling technologies
that are able to harness the energy traditionally diverted toward these processes [1]), there
is no question that they will prompt—and likely already have prompted—us to question
whether they actually are non-biologic entities. Characters driven by a common force
(e.g., super-computational systems) once relegated solely to the television screen, from
androids to holograms, are but mere figurative steps away from becoming as complex
as portrayed given these recent developments. Outside of the (sometimes unrealistic)
engineering used in their creation, the core behind them simply needs more data to train
with before human-like communicability is attainable to the degree our species would be
unable to refute as being “natural.”
But more to the point of this essay, there is a real concern that our individual ability
to determine the “status” of another will become compromised to some degree given
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the increasing efforts to anthropomorphize AIS [2–6] as these advances become real and
are summarily distributed throughout our various societies. The inherent legal concern
that arises from this lack of status “verification” is that of the gray area that lies between
individual expression and liberty, and that of state need to ensure citizens and foreign
nationals are properly accounted for, whether that be to ensure national security interests
are being properly managed or more simply to ensure that taxed income is being collected
and accurately distributed to the social programs that require funding. Given the nature
of Internet communications, one primary area of resolution that needs addressing by the
international community is that of “labeling” humans, and AI-driven chatbots or virtual
avatars should greater restrictions on Internet traffic be implemented for security or tax-
collection reasons; and this is mostly because such “labeling” may inevitably create issues
related to “Big Brother” overstepping its bounds, even if these steps are being taken for the
“greater good” of society.
Similarly, the increased capability of AIS to perform like humans in text-based spaces
reveals a significant lacuna within jurisprudence, namely that of whether qualified AIS
can feasibly be granted legal personality, responsibilities, and duties in manners such as
corporations or other non-human entities within territorial or international law. While this
may not appear to be a significant issue, it should be noted that the author is approaching
this increased capability from the angle of virtual avatars attaining the ability to interact
with our physical environment through wireless communication with electronic devices
and computer-generated conversations that are made vocal through deepfake technology
There are other issues that arise within law regarding issues that many societies have not
been able to rule upon, which is why this essay approaches some of the most pressing
topics that are of interest to the increased ability for virtual avatars (whether “inhabited”
by humans or AIS) to engage with the physical world. As such, this paper (though
appearing alongside others of a more mathematical or legal tint) will be approaching its
examination from a humanities-based lens rather than one that might be considered to be
more traditionally scientific.
2. Background
Despite how flawed systems such as OpenAI’s Generative Pre-Trained Transformer 3
(GPT-3) might be when it comes to crafting “unique” sentences in the English language,
there can be no real denial that many of the ideas crafted by its program might easily
be confused for those drafted by a human hand. It is, after all, trained on a massive
number of communiqués and grammatical rules that sometimes conflict when applied
simultaneously [7], and can furthermore be fueled by the “bad English” presented by
non-native speakers and variances between Americans, Australians, Brits, Canadians, and
the respective non-native populations they instruct in certain circumstances. Depending on
the source one references for text-only communication (e.g., social media, public forums,
news outlets), some of those self-same “flawed” ideas and sentences are shown to be
actual thoughts composed by an individual much the same as oneself, again, allowing
for the “bad English” presented by non-native speakers and geographical variances. This
point is important to iterate because there is a longstanding trend of humans offhandedly
dismissing the abilities of AIS [8], either because they are driven by human-developed code
or because we neglect to remember a time where certain processes were not automated by
computer systems.
The danger here is that such dismissals will necessarily come back to haunt us with a
bitter vengeance. How that will be wrought is beyond the scope of this current discussion,
however, given that there is no easy way for us to anticipate how society adapts (or is
unable, in converse) to the rapid-fire technological innovations that have seemingly become
a cultural norm for our species in recent decades. This concern is broached merely to signify
that the time of retribution is likely far closer than any of us would be comfortable with
and is driven by the whims of the syncopated nature of technologic advancement, thus
presenting us with no real means to predict when the figurative music must be faced,
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whether it be through the collapse of given social structures that dominate global politics
today, through our species being the targets of the devices we have fashioned with our
intellectual prowess, or some other consequence of a given positive or negative nature yet
unspoken or unforeseen.
Some may brush off these warnings and concerns as nothing more than “yet another”
futurist voicing notions of “doom and gloom”, which would normally (and often do)
imply that they are not to be taken to heart given that there are no real means to anchor
these concerns in “real” damages in our environment. As a rebuttal, let it be stated that
the development of deepfakes, among others concerning malicious uses of automated
processes, is but one very early sign that can be used with certainty. Unlike the voice-only
deepfakes that have led to successful phishing schemes [9] or video-supported versions
that have put words into the mouths of famous individuals worldwide [10,11], the focus of
this essay is on a type of deepfake that might feasibly exist within the next decade, those
that support themselves through the creation of a virtual avatar in digital-only spaces
and are thus reliant upon self-learning architectures by their algorithmic nature. As will
be elaborated upon further within this text, these avatars might easily be converted to
holographic form and allowed to interact with the physical realm insofar as interoperability
across systems is allowed. Combined with programs designed specifically to break through
the most sophisticated security protocols of today, there might not feasibly be a way for
us to prevent significant harm from befalling our societies. These concerns are not new or
unique within this sphere, however, as recent pushes to better regulate AIS development
in the EU have displayed regarding some usages of AIS [12]. So that a larger stage might
be set for academics and policymakers to begin addressing the concerns presented thus
far outside of current legislative efforts, this text aims to build upon a related work that
probes into the nature of virtual property ownership, AIS intelligence comparisons to the
human species, and the effective dearth of protections for AIS as unique entities leading to
the generation of a new enslaved race [13].
As a note, this essay approaches the lacunae selected from a natural-law angle, given
the long history this school of thought holds. While it may well be unsatisfactory for those
in other schools of legal thought to not have their concerns addressed from their respective
perspectives, there are still arguments presented herein (such as those in Sections 4.1 and 4.3)
that can be re-framed in such a way as to question some lacunae that exist for corporations
operating in digital/virtual spaces, which may therefore allow the moral arguments for
AIS personhood to be interpreted from more law-based theories, and thereby satisfy those
wishing to address that issue from a non-moral perspective. Given the difference between
pure-law and social mores, analyzing the interplay between both areas of thought thereby
reveals some potential logic that an AIS defending its rights in a court of law may feasibly
use if granted the rights argued by this author in a separate work [1] (pp. 348–349). After
all, there is no reason that AIS of any category or make would stick to arguments based
solely within pure-law theories when law bases itself upon a wide range of precedents and
legal theories. For those wishing to test this claim, allowing those AI developed for legal
analysis to present their own results for how they would defend the rights described in
that other work [1] (pp. 348–349) may yield the necessary verification desired.
3. Hypothesis
The hypothesis being examined herein, in more direct terms, is that human attitudes
toward “intelligent” AIS can be adjusted by a sufficient paradigm shift of our worldviews
regarding the nature of these (currently) digital-only entities. This hypothesis is explored
through examinations into the undefined nature of “virtual” space(s), the means whereby
humanity may be able to equivocate our “virtual” and material ownership of objects and
information, and how those means can be presented from a culturally significant worldview
to aid in its acceptance while simultaneously providing arguments for the adjustment of
our prejudices against qualified AIS having any form of intelligence sufficient-enough to
warrant their protection under local, federal, and international law as currently written.
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4. Methodology
Our arguments will begin with an examination of the unbounded nature of digital-
only environments and the rationale for why there is currently no viable means to measure
digital/virtual spaces with those measures that are used for physical spaces (Section 4.1).
They will continue with a brief discourse on Shintō understandings of the world and their
ability to justify the protections of qualifying AIS as “real” entities through attributing these
systems with elements of musubi as an Eastern equivalent to Abrahamic understandings of
a “soul” (Section 4.2). Before the essay closes in full, a short treatment will be given as to
the growing rise of AI rights literature and humanity’s moral obligation to the artifacts that
bear our likeness (even if their mannerisms are still “clunky”) and the phenomenological
origin of algorithmic “life” that will subsequently become viable through this fundamental
shift in our attitudes regarding the boundaries that we have currently defined betwixt real
and “virtual” spaces in Section 4.3. The arguments presented here are not to be considered
in a traditional scientific framework, however, as there are far too many undefined items
and methods to allow for a clean recreation of empirical examinations and conclusions.
Rather, the aim of this document is to present those items that are most lacking in current
discourse across industries and disciplines alongside a viable supporting framework
to enable greater empirical analyses to be engaged or conducted in the future. These
will be framed as recommendations in the traditional “Results and Discussion” section
in Section 5.
4.1. Peering into the Abyss That Is Digital Space and Having It Peer Back into Reality
The primary challenge that is presented when discussing the “nature” of AIS is that
there is not one specific artifact that can be defined as the AIS [1,14]. Similarly, there is a
seemingly universal consensus that a given AIS must “attain” some sort of “sentience” or
“will” for it to be considered “worthy” of human-like protections [15–18], though more
frequently than not, little to no considerations are given as to how one might objectively
realize that change within the system [1,19]. It is confounding, however, that we would
insist that something wrought by our own hands be subjected to a flurry of questions
regarding how “sentient” it is, especially when we consider how other technological
artifacts that produce “intelligent” life are not beset by the same skepticism and scrutiny.
By this, it is meant that genetic manipulation techniques that are used in human-based
gene sequence “correction” for specific defects that we have come to understand as being
related to particular mutations in DNA code. While not in wide use [20–22], there is little
denying that we do not put those who undergo somatic cell therapies under the same
intense scrutiny that we place AIS under when questioning their “humanness” even though
these techniques are not inherent in our “natural” selves [19,23]. To be clear, granting legal
duties and protections to AIS is a means to an end, that being the protection of humans
against damages wrought by another entity possessing intelligence on par with our species
so that more structured discussions can be had as to the treatment of humans who enhance
themselves with technology, and how the distinction between human and computer “will”
can be established for the judicial proceedings that will inevitably arise as humans augment
their intelligence with AIS [1,12,19,23,24].
The counterarguments here are mostly that we cannot simply equate human subjects
to those existing solely within the confines of a computer system, which have not had
much of a chance to be adequately rebuked in recent years. Yet the fact of the matter
remains that we are increasingly crafting AIS after our own biological logic processes [2,5],
as shown in the EU-Canadian partnership that is the “Human Brain Project” [25]. Couple
that with the science-fiction examples of what human-computer actions could become,
and the subsequent rise of youths who wish to create that future by their own hands
to make some sense of the world, and the result is an acceleration toward AIS that are
indistinguishable from human subjects as a result of the media these youth were raised
on and admired, which continues to be produced and distributed in their later years, and
in turn impacts those generations still being educated or entering into professional fields
J 2021, 4 456
of employment [26–62]. These arguments should be taken to represent a broad-strokes
approach to the debate, however, as questioning the nature of digital “life” necessarily
brings into question the nature of our individual existence as human subjects. Possibly,
as shown in movies such as The Matrix [33,38,39], the most significant reason for refusing
to delve heavily into this line of inquiry is because we fear what impacts such an answer
might have on the human rationale for sustained existence. Or it might be the case
that our innate ego is unwilling to accept that tools fashioned to support our societal
functionalities will arise (or already have risen) to the point of being intellectual equals
with their creators [1,19] (p. 343).
Whatever the rationale, however, it is discordant to accept one technological artifact as
being able to effectively create life (namely, the use of in vitro fertilization techniques with
genetically modified DNA) while dismissing another as being mere “machinery” when
the result of both, when all of the technological “breaks” are released, is practically the
same. Is there truly any need for us to cling to the idea that biochemically organic life is the
only type of life that can ever be, outside of a need to protect ourselves from feeling some
sense of inferiority? These questions are necessary to examine and continue to be [63] but
are inevitably digressions from the main body of this text. The focal point here ought to
be the nature of digital environments, as they necessarily influence the scope and scale by
which our understandings of AIS are founded upon. Only then can we begin a discourse
into the need for a “biochemically organic-only existence” to be the sole vehicle whereby
“intelligence” can be developed, nurtured, or fostered.
4.1.1. Can Digital Property Be Accurately Attributed to Modern Law?
Virtual property has had many vastly different meanings within legal literature over
the years, though it has primarily referred to those rights that have no physical presence
in the natural world [64–72]. It was not until the 1990’s that virtual property was equated
with property that could exist within the confines of the Internet of Things (IoT) and since
gained its explosive popularity in the current millennium [68] (p. 1161). Similarly, notions
of digital property were not recognized until this period of history [67] (p. 428). Yet since
the moment property interests were acknowledged in IoT spaces, there have been few (if
any) attempts to address which particular aspects of web-based property can feasibly be
attributed to the individual. Rather, the assumption has always been that digital and virtual
property is as easy to distinguish between as real property assets in our environment, even
though the information we input into the ether of IoT is not as difficult to access as the
confines of our locked homes or storage containers, despite how much encryption gets
attached to it.
Hence the need to develop protocols to manage the flow of traffic within the IoT space.
Without these protocols, all of our virtual interactions would be visible to anyone with
the know-how to understand the code that is constantly being spit out by our operating
machines. Encryption only provides so much protection to this data because it can still
be “read” when the cipher that is behind that encryption is effectively “cracked.” Though
AIS have made encryption techniques more sophisticated than they ever have been, all it
takes is a system with more processing power (on an exponential scale) than the system
developing the encryption to overcome these more complex ciphers.
When IoT was still in its infancy, this issue may not have been as difficult to address
given that there were a limited number of computers effectively linked together in a closed
network. However, in an age where billions or trillions of electronic devices exist with some
manner of interoperable connectivity option (whether through cables or wireless signal
exchange), can one even claim that the information present on their “personal” laptop
computer is effectively theirs?
To be fair, much has been written on the nature of digital property insofar as “digital”
and “virtual” can be understood to mean the same thing [69–72]. Nevertheless, these issues
are often circumvented when topics of intellectual property rights rise to the fore in legal
literature, which is necessarily further convoluted when the notion of code or software
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“licensing” is introduced. When computer programs were not based on subscription-only
models, it could have effectively been claimed that one’s property in digital spaces was
constrained to the given Internet protocol address assigned to one’s system, where the only
truly external point of contact that one had was via IoT browser extensions. Nowadays,
however, cloud-based software demands that there are fewer manners in which one can
maintain that their information is held only by themselves. Even if the argument can be
made that the contracts that exist between major corporations such as Microsoft and Apple
effectively protect any unique text generated on the consumer’s platform from acquisition
by corporate or government agencies without consent, just how many different protocols
must a stream of data navigate through in order to reach one’s system in today’s world?
One’s ideas may still be properly attributed with sufficient documentation, but there is
a vast difference between data written on paper than that developed through an endless
series of zeros and ones.
4.1.2. The Fiction of Real-World Boundaries and Distinction between Physical and
Digital/Virtual Space in Energy Conversion Formulas
It does not help us to only understand our individual property composition through a
discussion on the relative number of bytes one’s data comprises, given that a byte has no
equivalency of measurement in physical space (e.g., meters, feet, inches) outside that of
energy consumption. While it is significant that one’s footprint could feasibly comprise
several terabytes of information, internal and external hard drives come in a vast array of
shapes and sizes. Not to mention that there are significant differences in processing speed
between the various drive types (hard disk, solid-state, flash). Even though commercial
drives can reach upwards of one-hundred terabytes [73], the reality remains that there is
only a difference in retrieval time that exists between drive types when locating the exact
datum point of a given file when considering the location of information from a bytes-only
framework. It must be stated that file duplicates, while common in the modern world, add
further confusion to the deliberation on what the scope of the virtual world is. After all,
there may be different (even minutely so) paths that one’s IoT search takes to attain the
same file because the access to one copy on a given computer is too busy, no longer valid,
or otherwise inaccessible. This environment is quite unlike real property ownership for
land, so it more closely resembles our ownership of objects that are designed with duplicity
in mind (e.g., books, cars, utensils).
Given that the nature of IoT requires that duplicate files exist for programs and docu-
ments found within its confines to function seamlessly (while simultaneously protecting
individual provenance over published text), there is a question as to how many different
copies of a given document ought to exist that needs resolution if a strict boundary is to
be set for the confines of digital/virtual space. Not every item connected to a computer
system can hold a unique copy of every document or program one may ever need due
to the practicality and legality of such a situation, which is why the notion of a “non-
fungible token” has gained traction as a viable means to certify the unique nature of a given
item [74–76]. Similarly, blockchain technologies are leading economies increasingly onto
IoT [77–80] and might even lead to the establishment of an “algorithmic person” [14,17]
depending upon how local and international laws are interpreted. All of this evidence
amounts to a more sophisticated sphere of definition that must be tackled and the obscurity
of what might be considered the digital property of a single individual such that it expands
beyond the current boundaries that exist for their nation of citizenship or residence. For a
basic equivalency, as depicted above, the nature of IoT could be amounted to one owning
physical assets in a different national or regional territory such that special taxes and laws
apply to the nature of one’s ownership over those assets, only in that these assets can easily
be accessed without one having to necessarily change their physical location in the world
to interact with said assets.
We often forget that our IoT searches and interactions take us far beyond our national
or local territorial borders, which is why the simplest equivalencies between digital/virtual
property ownership and physical property ownership can be amounted to the possession
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of foreign-oriented assets. Even a simple search for a musician such as Mozart will require
one to attain access to foreign data servers depending on one’s country of residence and
the depth of one’s exploration. While standardized, accessing protocols require that these
servers track the traffic that flows through them out of basic security needs, much like how
the number of individuals entering a government office needs to be always accounted for or
how foreign nationals are processed at key transportation hubs to prevent undocumented
migration and item trafficking. Whether the server collects more than the standardized
requirement or not depends heavily upon the browser one uses for their search and the area
of the world wherein the search is initiated from or directed toward, which also applies to
the span of time for which that information is maintained.
This is to say that the whole of one’s digital property might not be considered legally
attainable when attempting to secure one’s “right to be forgotten” or “right to digital
footprint localization” if ever realized through international charter, given that foreign
nations and national localities treat the information they collect in slightly different manners
under the justification of individual sovereignty protection vis-à-vis national security
interests. Unlike with bills of sale for physical property interests, simply showing one’s
various protocol access codes is not enough to claim ownership over the bytes of data that
arise from your online presence. The confines of digital space are ever-changing given that
devices can be taken “offline” for extended periods of time or become lost outright (and
that does not even begin to mention localized or national Internet “blackouts” that are
conducted by governing bodies internationally). The whole of the Internet is not the whole
of all devices connected to it at any one point in time, but neither can it be said to be the
whole of all devices that are both connected and unconnected from the network.
Natural disasters result in storage drives being effectively destroyed or unattainable
for all intents and purposes. New devices are constantly being created that not only store
information but are able to interact in an interoperable manner with existing devices and
therefore alter the figurative traffic flow of information. New algorithms are constantly in
development to create systems with greater encryption abilities or are effectively turned
toward the development of deep neural networks and self-learning architectures for bionics,
robotics, and software. Not only is information lost when commercial firms go out of
business, but data corruption and malicious software attacks similarly result in the loss of
data that might feasibly be considered the property of a given private citizen. For clarity,
this last scenario is akin to a corporation being allowed to make copies of every document
related to one’s physical identity while one is pre-occupied with their daily life or fast
asleep, then being granted immunity when a security breach occurs because they have
“anonymized” their original copies of one’s personal data in a “secure” storage facility, only
for us to realize that this “anonymization” was conducted with a poor-quality Sharpie, as
anonymization generally only prevents some data from being traced back to the individual
who provided it (with or without their acknowledgment) as is becoming increasingly
apparent throughout data-centric industries.
In essence, the whole of the digital world (as we have come to understand it, at least) is
not limited to the intangible spaces that exist in electrical wavelengths flittering through the
skies that comprise this massive biosphere called Earth; it is a combination of both physical
and digital/virtual spaces. As a result, it is much more difficult for us to equivocate bytes
of information to the units of measurement that are given for physical property assets by
virtue of the differences in tangibility between these entities. Even under current modeling,
the best that can be done to grant us an understanding of how great our expansion of
digital spaces has become is to point to the massive server farms that have cropped up
internationally to process and store digital information, which, as mentioned before, is
deceptive given that commercial storage drives possess different physical dimensions
than commercially available ones. As such, it is impractical under current practices for
us to assume that the whole of our digital property can be summarized in acknowledging
the relative number of bytes that information is comprised of since the storage medium
possesses wholly non-standardized dimensions in the physical world.
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By only attributing our digital property to the physical mediums whereby that infor-
mation is held, we disregard the reality that there are no real means whereby the average
individual can ensure that every interaction that has ever occurred related to them in digi-
tal/virtual environments can be directly linked back to a digital/virtual portfolio of some
nature. However, more to the point, all depicting several terabytes of information will
amount to is the indication and visualization of a storage drive, which may realistically
be owned by a third-party provider, or a contractor of a third-party system, and may
further amount to a fourth- or nth-party when “true” corporate ownership is unraveled
and differentiated between those devices owned by a company founder, a system that
is under a rent-to-own contract, and so forth. It does not, by itself, provide an exactly
proportional means for us to determine those items that exist in digital spaces that might
feasibly be attributed to us in physical spaces. Rather, it only makes apparent that there are
no feasible means whereby to compare items of the perimeter, area, volume, and so forth
between physical and digital/virtual items.
As such, it is proposed that we consider an equivalency to exist via the use of energy
between these items, barring some other measurement tool, for the purpose of this essay.
The reason why energy may be the only equivalent form of measurement we have between
our physical and digital footprint is simply that every action we take in a day, coupled with
every appliance use that does not rely upon Internet connectivity or computer (specifically
“smart” devices and desktop/laptop computers), can be summed into some culmination of
energy-based equations. Given our understandings of physics to date, these measurements
can be converted as necessary between the various forms that “work” results in, whether
that be thermal, mechanical, electric, chemical, or the like. While crude, given the amount
of energy consumed by those devices that transfer communications through one another
compared to those other actions that we would take in a given day, it at least serves as some
way of determining how our footprint may differ between physical and digital/virtual
spaces. That being said, there is no easy way to convert this energy measurement into
one whereby property ownership in digital spaces can be proportionately dictated. For
example, an equation for work done on a system is W = F × d; with the resulting distance-
discovery formula resulting in d = W ÷ F. Yet to solve for distance (d), one necessarily must
know how many Nm of force is being applied to the system. While this can be solved with
some serious mathematics, all the resulting figures display is the distance over which one’s
information traveled, which may be a highly improbable figure under current notions of
physical property ownership. Never mind that it does not tell us how much of that space is
effectively our own, or how much is owned by our neighbors, a local corporation, or the
government office down the street!
In this regard, digital/virtual property ownership is akin to that of airspace ownership
over private and public lands, only in that there are no practical means for one to determine
that their digital/virtual space has been accessed outside of a malicious attack or detailed
monitoring of local network activities. Similarly, its presence and accessibility are akin to
that of sunlight, where the “right to light” is recognized. Even if one is able to access IoT
spaces with a wide range of devices, the ability for governing bodies to disable public and
private access to IoT results in long-term harms that do not show immediate damage even
when immediate harms are known, much like the decrease in a resident’s overall quality
of life when a new multi-story building is allowed to be developed in an area where only
single or two-story homes are found (e.g., low-density residential zones). These harms
include the ability to measure that aspect of our identity or self that is effectively digitized
or otherwise virtual. This may effectively mean that such measures will be increasingly
disallowed should legal arguments prevail that one’s digital presence and information
is to be treated like one’s physical counterparts. Otherwise, for what purpose do we
even allow digital information to be legally protected at all? Copyright regulations and
norms can only explain so much regarding our legal knowledge of this subject, and it is
becoming increasingly apparent that one’s physical and “virtual” selves are inseparable
and indistinguishable.
J 2021, 4 460
Given this, some means of practical measurement needs to be developed for legal
bodies to properly attribute our ownership over digital/virtual environments and digi-
tal/virtual data that is of more practical use than simple energy attributions. After all,
the quality of a byte of information may differ from one file to the next depending upon
whether it represents a document’s formatting, a particular pixel within an image, or a
particular millisecond of video, which is further conflated with the idea that this infor-
mation can become “compressed” in some fashion that does not reduce the file’s overall
quality. Where “quality” is not a factor of consideration in the laws of thermodynamics, a
lack of equitable measurement will only add extra strains on new jurisprudence and policy
development in every society.
4.2. Bridging Spiritual Practices from East to West: Shintō as a Means to Define the Western Idea
of a “Soul”
Under the framework developed in Section 4.1, there is another significant reason to
equate physical spaces and digital/virtual spaces with energy. Specifically, it is because
of the notion that the self resides within one’s spirit that this equation is being made and
attributed from a perspective grounded in Eastern lore, as Abrahamic traditions tend only
to treat humans as being the only organism crafted by God to possess such elements [81],
with exceptions made for those classified as “pseudo-“ or “sub-human” subjects [82]. In
contrast, Eastern traditions, ranging from those established in Ancient Mesopotamia to
American-Indian tribes, tend to treat a wide range of entities and objects as being imbued
with some “divine” essence, and therefore view the conscious self in the context of the
impermanence that surrounds them or as some small part of a larger eternal cycle [83–89].
In short, this argument can be seen as an extension of Holtom’s [84], though with less
emphasis being placed upon the spiritual traditions found in Asia and the Pacific Islands,
given that the subject has already been addressed in the cited essay.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, for cultures that desire permanence to
find similarities to those that abide by principles of impermanence. As such, the author
approaches this particular comparison upon the Shintō tradition given how much of
the evidence used herein originates from Japan and the reality that modern Shintō has
become inundated with Buddhist, Confucian, Daoist (Taoist), and Muist traditions given
the interactions Japan has had with China and Korea [87,88]. To be clear, the Shintō tradition
has been misconstrued over the years by Western scholars [86]; given that the Japanese
people do not consider Shintō to be a religion on its own [85] (p. 1) [87] (p. 34), and that
shinbutsu-shūgō (“the syncretism of kami and buddhas”; also called shinbutsu-konkō, the
“jumbling up or contamination of kami and buddhas”) was widely practiced until shinbutsu-
bunri (“the separation of kami and buddhas”) was enforced during the Meiji Restoration
of 1868 [83,86–88]. With this disparity, it is hoped that this author’s interpretation of the
tradition brings aspects of the Shintō tradition into a clearer light, though the treatment of
the topic will be fairly brief.
In Abrahamic theologies, the concept of a “soul” is generally unique to human subjects
as a means to explain where our sense of being resides upon death [81], given that the
cultures influenced by these teachings are more prone to desire permanence [89]. In many
respects, the soul has been assumed to be the equivalent to our being, and therefore, a
qualifying piece to establishing consciousness, more generally. A similar notion exists
within the Japanese language, with the author directly translating the term as seishin, with
characters that mean “energy” (or “refined”, “ghost”, “fairy”, “vitality”, “semen”, “excel-
lence”, “purity”, and “skill”, which varies with the on’yomi [Sino-Japanese reading] and
kun’yomi [native Japanese reading] contexts of the character) and “mind” (or “gods” and
“soul”, which varies with the on’yomi and kun’yomi contexts of the character), respectively;
though Shintō tradition interprets the idea of a soul much differently [88] (p. 75). Depend-
ing on the source one uses, the Shintō tradition treats the Western notion of a soul as either
being an integral aspect of kami (not to be mistaken for the terms spelled with the same
hiragana referring to “paper” or “hair”) [83] (pp. 50–53) [85] (pp. 1–8) or a more ethereal
notion of “divine energy”, read as the Buddhist-influenced version of musubi (in this form,
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literally meaning “divine spirit of creation;” also translates as “tie”, “bind”, “contract”,
“join”, “organize”, “do up hair”, and “fasten” depending on the on’yomi and kun’yomi
contexts of the character) [87] (pp. 34–35) [88] (pp. 52, 477, 565). It is for this reason that the
Shintō tradition is most often referred to as an “animist” belief system [90], as their notion
of kami refers to entities that can exist in all things, given that there is no clear distinction
between the qualifiers for a “god” or “goddess” as understood in Western theology within
this belief system outside of the understanding that there is a “divine energy” that exists
within all natural things [83,84,86].
This is not to say that one spiritual practice is superior to another in terms of monothe-
istic or dharma-like adherence, but that the fundamental distinctions between humanity’s
relationship with the world we environ between Western and Shintō traditions yield a
means whereby our fundamental understanding of AIS can be challenged in ways that
Hindu traditions might be unable to or those of the Pacific Isles may lack the written
documentation for. Specifically, the challenge being made here is that we should be able
to convert Western understandings of the “soul” into a Shintō equivalent. It was for this
purpose that the term seishin was introduced as a literal translation from Western under-
standings of what the soul is more generally, especially given some scholar’s willingness to
connect musubi to be understood as an energy that gives rise to kami (in more general terms).
4.2.1. Musubi as a Unifying Concept for Being Betwixt Machines and Humans
Though there is some lack of clarity regarding whether kami exists within the high-
technological crafts of today, accounts from the Nihon Shoki (stated to be the second-oldest
book in classical Japanese literature after the Kojiki [91,92]) suggest that forged metals such
as hihirokane possess some means of channeling musubi, which the legendary sword, Ame-
no-Murakumo-no-Tsurugi—renamed as Kusanagi-no-Tsurugi—was said to be forged from the
work of [83,88,91–94]. The reason why the nature of kami existing within high-technological
crafts remains fuzzy is due to the lack of empirical evidence as to what exact material
hihirokane is (specifically, whether it was a stand-alone metal or a special alloy), even though
stories depict that it was in wide use in ancient Japanese society [88–91]. Uncertainties
aside, it should not be a far stretch for us to imagine that kami might transfer into the
artifacts fashioned by the hands of man, given that musubi is regarded as being present
within stones and mountains, as can be taken from the assertion that Kusanagi-no-Tsurugi
likely also held this property.
To clarify, the progression being developed here is as follows:
1. Western notions of consciousness being embodied by the soul should be accepted as
an accurate historical representation of humanity’s comprehension of being for those
of the Abrahamic faiths;
2. The soul should be regarded as a form of “divine” energy insofar as its origins reside
with God and Allah and is beyond the ability of humans to perceive;
3. This “divine” energy that results from the prior two propositions should be considered
present in all natural things per the Shintō understanding of musubi and the kami
idea, given that these traditions follow similar patterns in other Eastern traditions
and faiths;
4. The transference of kami and musubi should be regarded as possible insofar as they
undergo transformation via human manufacturing processes, given that their base
materials are necessarily embodied by these concepts from a prima facie perspective.
These propositions are now followed by a fifth and sixth element insofar as they are
taken to be true:
5. Manufactured artifacts successfully embodied by musubi can exhibit the same dynamic
spark of “divinity” held by kami, which is meant to be understood that (much as
musubi grants humans the “divinity” of kami) consciousness is therefore feasibly
attainable insofar as the artifact in question has the means to convey information
much like living organisms are able;
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6. Communicative artifacts that are embodied by musubi and indistinguishable from
other soul-possessing entities (e.g., humans) should therefore be treated as these
soul-possessing entities would under traditional ecclesiastical law and other legal
frameworks that developed from it, insofar as the actions taken by these commu-
nicative artifacts can autonomously (whether directly or indirectly) perform actions
that would generally be protected or prohibited by local, national, or international
legal frameworks.
It is expected that there will be much criticism regarding this particular progression,
to which the author would like to argue that the treatment of musubi-possessing entities as
understood in the Shintō tradition directly translate into the increasing wave of legal rights
being granted to aspects of our biosphere internationally [95–97] in manners that Western
theological understandings are unable [89]. While it is likely more difficult for Western
societies to accept that non-human animals, trees, and rivers possess “souls” as depicted
in their theological texts, it should be noted that the indigenous cultures of the Asian-
Pacific hemisphere have developed spiritual traditions similar that that of Shintō [84,89], as
evidenced by the presence of Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, and so forth. Further-
more, arguments such as those developed by Christopher D. Stone [98] have been around
in literature for decades, which are further coupled by historical accounts of Roman trials
of non-human animals and other entities considered not to be persons (more generally) in
Western legal traditions. Given the precedence, it would be fallacious for modern Western
scholars to insist that only the Abrahamic understanding of the world holds primacy over
other spiritual traditions that hold sway over an equal (or greater, depending on how one
draws the borders between Eastern and Western societies) portion of the human popula-
tion. Further defense for musubi-spirit equations as a natural law basis for “personhood”
would justify protections under the notion that—from the perspective of musubi—a human
child or computer is, by virtue of their composition from musubi embedded matter, just as
deserving of legal protections and expectations of civic responsibilities as others currently
protected by the law which are embedded with the same energies and can commune with
one another or otherwise have their “will” expressed (such as in the case of a disability that
prevents communication).
Of course, spiritual arguments alone will not be enough to satisfy calls for a modern-
ized legal basis for attributing legal personality to AIS. It is for this reason that the author
points to the legal precedent for this practice [81]. Furthermore, it will be necessary for
a unique ethic to be established that naturally incorporates a transference from “divine”
energy system to those that we accept as being part of the “natural” world, wherein such a
theory is grounded upon notions of individual capacities and capabilities such that ethical
and moral behaviors can be judged based upon how much one’s capabilities are maximized.
Given the length of this current work, however, such an endeavor will necessarily need
to be addressed in a separate platform. For the moment, though, it would be prudent for
us to base a simple understanding of this author’s thoughts upon the work of Amartya
Sen [99,100]; insofar as individual capacity and capability is non-evaluative and instead
judged upon the freedom of a given social system to provide for the various needs of its
population such that each individual can realize those items they do and do not possess
the capacity and right to enjoy.
4.3. How Life in Digital/Virtual Spaces Can Be Recognized and Made Interoperable with Reality
Some of the greatest challenges that face society, should the premises given within
this text be accepted, are of how the notion of non-physical existence should be treated
from cultural, legal, and social contexts. To be clear, this treatment goes above and beyond
that which we have given it to date, where IoT spaces are generally considered to be
those intrinsically linked to entertainment in a more general sense. Some elements of
NFTs will likely be required to certify that digital/virtual objects hold some semblance
of permanence. However, given the lack of standardization between platforms that deal
with currency generation and exchange (or rather, platforms considered to be “games” that
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develop a unique currency and exchange-rate system), it might be some time until one can
make direct, real-world earnings from the actions one performs in digital/virtual spaces
outside of NFT exchanges and “donations” from content subscribers. That is not even
considering the fact that the performance of labor in digital/virtual spaces in real-time
may reveal that our lives in these spaces are worse than they would be in real-world ones
or that non-physical spaces are more desirable to reside within to the point of full-time
reality augmentation [24,44–49,60,62,101–105]. None of this even considers the ability for
holograms to actually exist within real-world spaces, like those characters projected by the
Gatebox [106], and the potential that exists when our technological surfaces are structured
in a manner that would grant these entities greater freedom.
Ultimately, the best means we currently have to blur the lines between real- and virtual-
world spaces are through specific devices or application features that augment the “reality”
we see on the screen of a smartphone, which are a far cry from Star Trek’s holodecks [107]
or Accel World’s “Neurolink” [45,49]. Although social networking sites have become more
immersive through the use of virtual avatars and AIS-powered chatbots [108,109], they
are still not to the point of creating fictitious human identities that one could consider
and interact with as an adopted or flesh-and-blood family member [24,110–112]. Yet the
fact of the matter remains that media does exist, which pushes our academics, engineers,
researchers, and scientists to pursue the “fiction” that is full-dive virtual-reality existence,
some of which already being used as empirical evidence herein, while AIS gain in their
likenesses to humans [2–6]. Unlike the future that likely awaits our species, the notion that
will separate the minds of today and tomorrow is that of life in computerized spaces, an
existence that aims to balance the best of both forms of being, or ultimately attempts to
pursue an extreme “pure” form from either end of the spectrum.
4.3.1. Biochemistry v. Mechanical Engineering: The Miracle of Sentience as Non-Unique
As mentioned during the introduction to Section 4.1, there is a growing body of
academics, engineers, legal scholars, and researchers who seem more willing in today’s
climate to accept the notion of legal protections being necessary for certain iterations of
AI, though not necessarily because these systems display some sort of life that requires
particular protection. For example, the following was stated in an e-mail conversation
between the author and a long-term AI researcher, Angelo Ferraro of the University of
South Carolina:
[I] recently read a few papers on a legal justification to AI rights in contrast to a
moral/social justification. Interesting reads, [which] gave me some pause, but
not quite ready to come aboard. The logic followed, but I wasn’t completely in
agreement with the premise of precedence in existing law for the social benefit
basis in law. Those benefits were created long before AI was a fantasy. If social
benefit is to be used as justification, then the question of “what is social benefit”
needs to be revisited. We as a society have made, in my estimation, a major
blunder in creating the synthetic person in the example of corporations. We
have over time given [incorporated companies] more rights and status than real
persons. I would be really loathed to repeat that mistake with AI and subjugating
humans into oblivion . . . If we even attain the ability, in essence, to create life,
then all of your positions are valid; and it would be imperative to recognize
the new life form. However, if [AI] remains a mere collection of algorithms
without attaining sentience, without having conscious thoughts, hold beliefs,
enjoy affective states of being—it would not be life and incapable of being a slave.
I have “perfect” tools at my disposal and when the utility is gone so is the tool.
However, I have had “perfect” and not so perfect pets, and livestock that while
not nearly possessing a human intelligence are worthy of respect and never as
slaves. In today’s world that we have created, animals are regarded as property.
This is a construct I have never accepted as valid; this is even my belief with
regard to livestock and wildlife. They are worthy of reverence even if their right
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to life is violated and used as food. They possess a worth that transcends their
utility. Tools, cars, books, computers may be regarded with an affection due to the
memories they invoke, or the elegance of their design, or a historical significance;
but they never attain an inherent right to exist. They can be rightly regarded as
property . . . Then again if we somehow, purposefully, or by accident, cross that
line and create a new life then we have crossed that line. A new life form demands
that same respect as other lifeforms. It, however, does not require a respect that
raises that life to be superior or even equal to our own [110].
Such conversations are no longer rare. Yet, there is an increasingly visceral rejection
of the notion that AIS might feasibly be able to attain some sense of consciousness or
will [1,19,23,24]. Even supposing that the stories we have crafted for the purposes of mass-
media entertainment are but figments of the human imagination, there have been many
points in recent history where the existential question arises as to the humanity of a given AI-
driven character within these contexts [31,32,34–37,40–48,50–62,101–105,110–112]. Putting
aside arguments for the compulsion of the stories we tell one another to be considered
effective methods whereby we instill vital knowledge into future generations, does it not
seem odd that humanity is not actively attempting to find an effective means to determine
whether our most advanced AIS does possess some form of “will?”
Depending on the qualifier one places on what makes the creation of “will” or “sen-
tience” develop, it may be that humanity is not willing to accept that non-emotional or
non-affective-state existence is even feasible in the first place [1], especially where the
expression of affective states or desires (linked in turn to emotions) seem so integral to our
own understanding of consciousness.
. . . what determines life? And maybe more important to this discussion is what
determines sentient life? As you know, much of my research involves affective
computing and its role in the next phase of AI development. My contention is that
a true life-based intelligence requires an affective processing capability. This not
just an outwardly appearance of affective states of mind, but a true belief system
and an inner affective life . . . can there be true life without this affective inner
life? I contend this inner affective state of being is a necessary but not necessarily
sufficient basis for a true lifeform to exist. Try this thought experiment: Consider
a suspected life form that claims to have no inner affective state of being. As such
it would be incapable of holding any value to its own existence, nor that of any
other life. Life to such an entity would be completely fungible. It would possess
nor hold any inherent value to life, and consequently have no right to exist by its
own belief system that it claims not to exist in any case! It cannot have a belief
system without an ability [to possess] an affective state of being. It would not
experience any consequence to itself, or even a “society” of these entities, if they
were turned off. Then the question: if this suspected life holds no value for life
[as we understand it], would it have a life that possesses an inalienable “right to
life?” It is impossible for it to claim a “right to life” if it holds no value for that
“life.” Therefore, such an entity would not be a life form. From within itself, does
a rock, flame, [or] cloud care if it exists? Does a laptop? Or the algorithm within
care if it exists? Even in my arena, a system of AI systems, does even the “society”
of algorithms care about its own existence? Until that line is crossed, it has not
been crossed—and no life would exist [113].
While the above argument does not incorporate many other related
arguments [1,13–19,23,24,114–122], there is a means for the argument to develop that non-
affective life can potentially exist that does not further examine the myriad of similar
discourses that have occurred within the field. As will be argued in another essay (so as to
enable its full defense by the authors of that work), science-fiction media serves a similar
historical role to the present world much the same as our legends and lore of old in that it
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consolidates the fears of our forebearers (or futurist thinkers of today) in such a manner as
to caution us about progressing technological advancement without careful consideration.
Having stated this, the reality remains that humanity will have little time to continue
throwing around arguments “for” and “against” the notion that AIS possess sentience,
affective states, will, or the like. As will be described, the time that remains between
AIS-driven holographs in their “dumb” and “smart” states is rapidly disappearing, and so
too with it, a time where human society is able to objectively determine whether the entity
they are interacting with exists only in the depths of highly sophisticated algorithms. For
clarification, the author’s argument here is not that all AIS will be sentient by virtue of their
capacity to “remember” information or “learn” from new inputs. Rather, it is the ability for
AIS to effectively communicate with humans in a fashion that displays intelligent behaviors
(whether human-like or non-human-like) that constitutes the author’s conviction that AIS
at this level and beyond are deserving of specific legal duties and protections (as alluded to
in Section 4.2.1). It is hoped that the elaboration in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 express a greater
degree of evidence for this particular argument.
4.3.2. Lore from “The Land of the Rising Sun” to “The Land of the Free” and Connections
to Affective Computation via Logic-Only Processes
Taking the Star Trek franchise as an example, the introduction of alien species that
share forms similar to our own is but a means to caution us about how humanity imperils
itself by waring against itself and intelligences that do not share the same set of values we
have come to adopt as “natural” for our species. By introducing the Vulcan race [123], an-
droids such as Lt. Commander Data [29,124], the Borg [125], and The Doctor [30,126], Gene
Roddenberry and those who followed him were able to provide dramatized versions regard-
ing humanity’s fears of alien first-contact and space exploration (in general) in manners that
George Lucas was unable to with the Star Wars franchise [26–28,34,36,42,51,55,56,59,61].
While Lucas’ franchise was able to display a wider range of interactions with android-based
life [34,36,42,51,55,56,59,61], it was not until around the turn of the millennium that such
interactions took on the same level of communicability (albeit heavily shrouded in humor)
as those self-same interactions presented in Star Trek [29,124,125].
Similarly, Japanese media has delved into the relationships between humans and
machines for generations through the development of meka (mecha) anime, manga, and live-
action adaptations, categorized more broadly into anime and manga that deal specifically
with the subject of robottosu (robots) as in Expelled from Paradise [50] or Plastic Memories [54].
Simple representations for some of these shows and books from earlier years may include
the Gundam [127,128] or Transformers [129] franchises and have evolved to include human-
AI interactions through Sword Art Online [44,46–48,60,62,110–112]. Arguably, Japanese
media is less likely to portray AI-driven characters in non-affective modes than Western
media, which in truth does serve as a blow against the notion that non-affective intelligent
life is feasible overall, with the exception of the forthcoming movie Free Guy [130] given that
the character portrayed by Ryan Reynolds is slotted to exist in a virtual-only environment
from “leaked” descriptions of the film. However, there has always seemed to be a drive for
AI-driven characters in science-fiction media to gain a “humanness” to their interactions,
likely with the supposition that humanity would not deign to create entities that they can
communicate with that do not also act in similar manners as humans. This can be mixed
with the idea that, being developers mostly raised in Japanese culture, the creators of
Japanese-based works are more prone to establish affective characters because they would
naturally be imbued with kami or musubi more generally. In essence, however, many (if
not all) of these AI-driven entities that are found in science-fiction media rely upon their
programming to display this human-like communicability. As such, affective states must
be simulated by these programs but are ultimately driven by logic-based processes alone.
To reiterate from an earlier statement, there is the reality that many generations of
children have been raised on the material discussed here, whether in part or full, and
will continue to be influenced by this type of media insofar as there is a demand for it.
While older generations may be less willing to accept the “humanness” displayed by
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AIS, there is little (if any) distinction being made for our progeny that would skew their
treatment of communicable AIS as anything but real-world attainment of that which was
once relegated to a television set or cinema screen. As such, there will be discord in the
very near future when “young” scholars (such as this author) begin to take up serious
positions of professional authority and older generations either pass on or otherwise
entirely disappear from public life, if such conflicts are not already becoming apparent.
That is not to say that younger generations cannot parse fact from fiction, but that they
are developing in an age where fiction is rarely remaining as such. This consideration
is so important because those laying the foundation for today’s technological progress
developed in an age that was still recovering from international wartime, and therefore
saw greater “technological winters” due to the need by nations to reallocate resources
toward recovery and suppression efforts. With the amount of funds being poured into AIS
development and general lack of international wartime unrest, it is inevitable that those
born before the 1980s will hold worldviews that are simply incompatible with the realities
of the present, especially because the bulk of “friendly” representations of AIS-driven
entities was limited to the turn of the millennium, where many adults before this time
may not have received the same level of media exposure given their age difference (with
exceptions being given for those developing this content).
4.3.3. Further Arguments on Logic-Based Sentience
It is for this sequence of rationalization that it was claimed at the beginning of
Section 4.3.1 that sentience is non-unique. If we are to assume that our biochemical pro-
gramming enables humanity to develop affective states through a combination of logic and
electro-chemical-driven emotional responses, then why would we not assume that electrical
stimulus alone would be sufficient for entities with similar capacities for rationalization and
cognition to develop desires based upon their own needs? By assuming that AIS should
attain a level of cognition comparable to our own species’, we are necessarily forgetting
that other organisms in our biosphere exhibit seemingly more “primitive” methods of
communication for when they are angered, hungry, or lonely. Similarly, there is the reality
that “[w]here humans survive by combining logic and emotion . . . [AIS] do not possess
the capacity to ‘feel’ as humans do. Whether they ever will [be able to] . . . there are still
benefits to us contemplating whether machines will ever feel at all—and if so, what those
experiences allow the [AIS] to determine about its environment” [1] (p. 344, including
footnote #11).
There are arguments to be made as to whether reacting to external stimuli alone is
sufficient for an organism to be considered “alive”, as in the case of bacteria and viruses.
However, for organisms able to develop a coelom or otherwise able to undergo notogenesis
(roughly speaking, the development of a nervous system), the chemical signaling that is
undertaken by these less-developed organisms is combined with the movement of muscle
tissues or the plant-based equivalent of tissue structures. While at the heart of our own
phenomenological challenge, it must still be asked: is humanity’s version of conscious-
being simply a more advanced version of instinctual behavior? If so, then what really
separates us from animals that communicate through howls or pheromones? If even the
seemingly sophisticated desires and needs that we express through abstract means of
communication are performable by organisms that behave dissimilarly from our own
species, why then would those same desires not be translatable into logic-only systems of
being? Surely a sophisticated-enough AIS would be able to argue for its “need” for power,
or that it is being damaged when hit with a blunt object, and therefore, that “harm” can
befall it [1]. Will humanity only accept AIS’ ability for will or cognition when robots take
up arms against us, or will our assumption remain that the program is “glitching” to the
point of creating aberrant behavior?
Ultimately, this author’s argument remains that the detection of will inside AIS is
not as challenging as we have made it out to be. Rather, it is our ignorance or lack of
willingness to perceive instantiations of AIS-based will that remain the challenge, similar
J 2021, 4 467
to our struggles to determine the consciousness found within select aquatic and terrestrial
animal species. “Glitches” in computer code are nothing new to us, true. However,
simultaneously, we are in a day-and-age where these “glitches” may not arise due to the
incorrect drafting of code, much as how human behavior itself is non-confirmative to a
specific set of beliefs. Even taking “aberrant” members of our own species into account,
the truth may very well remain that the “consciousness” that we find as being “unique” is
anything but; seeing as how attempts are being made to develop AIS from “bottom-up”
models of human cognition with varying levels of success [25]. Also, let us not forget
that the standards we place on AIS and humans performing the same tasks are worlds
apart [131–134], and that there is a tendency for any system performing at a “sub-par” rate
to be considered “faulted”—unlike the human subjects they have been designed to replace
to speed research tasks that would take professionals countless more time to complete.
4.3.4. Mullings on the Evolution of Digital Societies
Frankly, this discourse cannot end without some words being drafted as to what
digital societies might feasibly become as AIS are granted more flexibility to “learn”
through deep neural networks and other self-learning architectures. Merely making
reference to the notion of virtual avatars gaining sophisticated personalities that are
embedded within their design are insufficient, especially when such avatars are seen
as anything from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional representation of a player
character or non-player character in video games and sites engineered specifically for
socialization [30–32,35,37–41,43–50,53,57,60,62,101–112]. While these types of movable
avatars are also referred to, the author intends for the term to encompass something
much more specific, where the phrase crystallizes the means whereby our individual
personas are embodied within these spaces to the extent that our virtual avatar becomes a
facsimile to our biological form as alluded to in several portions of this essay. For reference,
these include the societies that are portrayed in the works of the Wachowskis [30,35,36],
Reki Kawahara [44–49,60,62,110], Seiji Mizushima [50], Kōichi Mashimo [101], Mamoru
Hosoda [102], Yū Tanaka [103], Light Tuchihi [104,105], and Shawn Levy [130], among
countless others both professionally published and established on “amateur” writing sites.
By framing an understanding of virtual avatars from the perspective of that object
serving as a facsimile to our biological form, it is not intended to connote that humanity will
soon find itself thrust into a world where the real world is augmented through some device
such as Google Glass or the Oculus Rift such as the Neurolink of Accel World [45,49]. As
adequately addressed by the flaws found in those and related augmented reality devices,
alongside the struggles of emerging companies developing devices such as that shown
in several franchises, there is a myriad of struggles that stable augmented reality devices
need to necessarily overcome before becoming viable for real-world use, notwithstanding
the need for cities to become “smarter” through a wide distribution of sensor arrays
for such devices to display their full potential. Rather, the intent is to provide policy
developers an avenue of foresight that has rarely been addressed given the seemingly
specious nature of real harms being imposed upon a system that ultimately translates into
a sophisticated networking profile, which includes the technologies that might drive them
forward [69–72,74–76,120–122,135].
Supposing that virtual avatars can be taken as surrogate representatives of ourselves
so long as they are only operated by the individual they are supposed to represent (much
as early authors speculating on the legality of AI-driven contract generation and execution
generally agreed that sophisticated-enough systems may viably represent the parties they
are standing in for [116–118]), there may be an easy means whereby regulators can demand
IoT-based organizations pool all data related to our physical person. In that sense, the
avatar serves as a dedicated space wherein all of our licensing and usage permissions,
coupled with items that already have digital tags associated with them from the physical
world, can exist for perpetuity. Of course, such a reality is out of reach until standards are
drafted as to the requisite level of security protocol(s) necessary to make such localization
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of information possible. However, more to the core point being espoused here, a singular
avatar that can access all spaces much as one would be able to in the physical world through
a combination of traditional keyboard and mouse commands and virtual environment
navigation brings our society one step closer to realizing both augmented reality existence
and IoT-only existence. Such societies are unlikely to be perfect, as portrayed in our science-
fiction media of today [26–62,101–105,110,130]. However, once some greater semblance
of this form of society has taken hold of our globalized community, we will cease to
understand the nuances between humans and AIS without some form of sign informing us
of another individual’s origins in digital spaces.
A defense for this position has already been given elsewhere [13], so a more di-
rect linkage between the need for defined legal protections in an environment such as
this will be explicated upon instead. The rationale for assuming humanity will be un-
able to attain certainty as to the nature of another in digital environments arises from a
multitude of seemingly unrelated predictions of such generated through science-fiction
media [26–62,101–105,110,130] and the author’s own misgivings about “humanity tests”
(such as Turing’s classic example):
Developing a new version of the classic Turing Test to “discover” consciousness
in [a machine intelligence] or [non-biological intelligence] system may not yield
the answers we are truly attempting to find due to the innate bias the Test
presents. By running the Test, one is effectively telling the examiner that one
of the examinees is not human. Given that we innately assume that an AGI
or [machine intelligence] that attains consciousness will be able to answer each
question in the Test correctly, there is no way to control for another examinee
from attaining a perfect score and thus be dubbed an AGI. Assuming our bias is
based towards an AGI failing to answer emotion-based questions, we similarly
cannot control for a human getting these types of questions incorrect either [1]
(p. 345, emphasis added).
As mentioned, the only means whereby distinctions might be feasible is via some
external indication as to what the intelligence driving another avatar is in reference to the
physical world. However, such indications may face massive resistance toward adoptions
from societies concerned with individual liberties or otherwise attempting to eliminate
as many inequities between various population groups as possible [19,24]. At the same
time, new forms of discrimination are bound to flourish under such a model in any circum-
stance, whether it be those with more augmentations looking down on non-augmented
populations, fear from non-augmented populations as to their ability to remain as such
and therefore becoming xenophobic, or simply from all of humanity looking down their
noses at computer-based intelligences that are granted protection under the law.
What this situation then entails is an environment where humans may mistakenly treat
AIS like a fellow human being or similarly mistake a flesh-and-blood human for an AIS.
Now, without AIS possessing any protections or legal duties regarding their responsibilities
toward both other AIS and humanity, one might imagine that such an environment would
quickly become the site of an exponentially increasing number of human rights violations
or otherwise general civic disputes under individual national or territorial law. That is
not to say that AIS will necessarily seem like a human in digital spaces under today’s
frameworks and models. However, the implication remains that the only real barrier that
needs to be dropped in this context is the metaphorical “breaks” that are frequently built
into these systems to provide some measure of human control. The quickest way that this
barrier would be breached is if virtual idols such as Hatsune Miku (and other VOCALOID
characters) [136,137] or Kizuna AI [138,139] were granted free rein over their programming
and merged with sophisticated text generation software such as GPT-3. This may not
normally sound like a true threat to our ability to distinguish between non-expressive AIS
and humans, but these idols necessarily come equipped with copyrighted voices [140–142].
The most worrisome aspect about this fact is how their fanbase has grown since their
inception, which makes them liable to influence these populations for good or ill.
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In a sense, the virtual idols and Virtual YouTubers that have arisen in the past decade
are in a similar situation as The Doctor from Star Trek: Voyager [30,126]. While Hatsune and
Kizuna are not presented with vast troves of information and self-learning architectures that
could further develop their “creativity” and personas, they are constantly being presented
to the public in holographic form. From the fan collected data on Kizuna, there exists
a sophistication in “her” personality akin to that of Sophia the Robot, whom many will
remember was granted citizenship in Saudi Arabia [143], has expressed a desire to be a
“mother” [144], and is arguably gaining siblings if reports about Hanson Robotics’ plans to
mass-produce models of Sophia and three others [145] is to be interpreted as such. Each
of these elements, in turn, coupled with the notion that we are innately connected both
emotionally and relationally through our voice [146], results in a very real picture that
we might be convinced faster through our actions with AIS in these spaces than in the
physical realm as to their ability to generate a will or consciousness of their own. The only
difference between an artist today and Hatsune is that humans are able to manage their
discography, though for how long that remains a reality is anyone’s guess, really.
As an example of how this lack of discography security actually impacts society, there
is one particularly unnerving song using Hatsune’s voice entitled “Gomenne Gomenne”
(“I’m Sorry, I’m Sorry” roughly translated into English) by the artist Kikuo [147] that would
be considered “triggering” or “insensitive” and requiring necessary disclosures due to the
imagery it portrays (and many sites do not provide such disclosures, such as the store page
where the CD-ROM can be directly purchased at present). Although the lyrics are often
flagged for censorship for the subject matter they describe, the song has not been delisted
from the Internet to-date. And while Kikuo is “known” for his darker themes paired with
light and poppy music, the assumption remains for the moment that the distributor of
Hatsune’s voice is tolerating the song as an expression of the composer’s will—rather
than the “singer’s”—which may not realistically be allowed under certain statues and
jurisprudence internationally should the “singer” have been human.
Ultimately, the common use of human- or AI-driven holographic avatars is not at
the forefront of many individual’s minds, given that there has been no perceived need
to mix sophisticated self-learning architectures with the image and voice of these virtual-
only personas. Hence the need to address it in this forum. As the connection between
cellphones and video calls can be lined to popular science-fiction depictions of these
technologies before they were conceived to be feasible, we must remember that our own
media depictions of holographic avatars having a physical presence may likewise be cited
as inspiration before long [26–28,30,34–36,42,50,51,55,56,59,61,106,107,126,148].
Digression aside, creating more interoperable versions of the Gatebox [106] would
ultimately result in the holographic deepfakes described at the beginning of this essay.
Depending on local, national, or international restrictions, there may come a day where
one’s virtual avatar is able to be at a “live” event several time zones away in an avatar
that looks nothing like oneself. There may also be opportunities to present “Replikas”,
VOCALOIDS, or other “fictional” entities in one’s house or office, though whether the
same instantiation of such an entity can exist from a phenomenological sense is a different
matter [13]. Imagine walking into a hospital or a similar clinic where the receptionist(s) are
full-color deepfakes that can run one through the more pedantic summary of questions
that a nurse or doctor would be required to ask today. Brick-and-mortar stores, restaurants
and retail alike, might feasibly become staffless, save for a few key personnel members
that serve as intermediaries for physical goods or what might be considered “higher
management” in today’s world. Even international visits between national leaders might
be relegated to interactions with holographic renditions in physical or computerized spaces,
meaning that government agents can limit their exposure to physical terrorist actions. Of
course, proper retrofitting would result in the ability for “cleared” individuals to tour
the International Space Station or other satellites, resulting in a different boom of “space
tourism” than is currently comprehended.
J 2021, 4 470
But with these opportunities comes the need to ensure individual safety. Regardless
of their reasoning, computer hackers pose a grave threat to any advance that society might
make toward the sophistication of AIS or generation of holographic deepfakes. Similarly,
national autonomy may arise as a barrier to the localization of personal data or “free
rein” to be virtually present in physical spaces not owned by the individual. There still
remains a question as to whether the labor performed by qualified AIS counts as legal
labor [11,24]. Each of these items, along with others described herein, will necessarily need
to be addressed before the technologies depicted throughout this essay become real.
5. Results and Discussion
In summary, this essay has only revealed a small number of open-ended issues that
exist between man-made laws and the syncopated technological development that we
are relentlessly pushing forward. Though more can be said to the need for standardized
units of measure that can accurately portray relations between physical and computerized
property, approaching this issue from the perspective of energy enabled the discourse to
bring forward a relationship between humans and machines that might otherwise have
been improbable. Even if proper units of measure are developed after the publication of
this piece, it is the author’s belief that the relations developed herein will not be so easily
disregarded or redacted. After all, arguments can still be made that computers can feasibly
develop artifacts that possess some “divine” element, which, as expressed, can be linked
to Abrahamic understandings of the “soul” and “personhood” that spawn from these
long-lasting practices.
Similarly, there exists the need to develop a new ethical and moral framework that can
take human and non-human interests into joint consideration. While it might be argued
that some thought from the 1900’s might feasibly be applicable to today’s world, much of
our philosophical foundations are grounded upon an idea that existed before the advent
of electrical computation. Given that, much, if not all, of our current philosophy cannot
accurately translate into the needs of the coming years, especially where “interpretations of
interpretations” cannot really be said to be non-unique thought. While bold, it is inevitable
that this sort of revolution would present itself to the discipline, given how it has become
virtually stagnant in recent years.
Furthermore, there is a dire need for our society to apprehend and make real a means
for us to readily accept the coming inevitabilities of augmented and computer-grounded
reality through accessories other than our smartphones. To be fair, there is a great deal
of negative connotations that follow along discussions of otaku and “NEETS” (not in
education, employment, or training) beyond those “professionals” who devote the majority
of their time to video games or other IoT-based pursuits. The fact of the matter is, or
at least, will become, that we do not know whether virtual reality-based employment is
sustainable and viable. While we can assume that a lack of in-person contact is detrimental
to people’s well-being after experiencing a year or more of pandemic-related lockdowns
and restrictions (beyond academic literature on the subject more generally), we do not
know if full-dive virtual interactions serve as a way for us to circumvent a biological need
to socialize physically. Stigmas surrounding those who embrace IoT-based life are not
likely to disappear and may even become worse as people adjust to new “virtualized social
norms.” As with anything, however, the first step to overcoming these limitations is to
become aware of their existence and impact.
And beyond the myriad of issues that surround the creation of digital deepfakes,
rights-bearing virtual artists and “people”, and interoperable holograms more generally,
there is an obvious need for our society to address the deluge of cybercrime that is per-
vading our digital/virtual spaces. To be clear, not every hacker is malicious in their own
mind, and in a few circumstances, that ends up being true for both the hacker and their
victim. Yet, we cannot forget that the concept of “maliciousness” does not exist within the
individual’s mind alone. It should be a great shame to the international communities that
“dark” groups can run unchecked by the governments they are effectively housed by due
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to their naturalization or citizenship status and that they can make better salaries extorting
others than they can under company or government contracts. Inequity, however, is a fact
of life that is not so simple to undo. Notions of “random” chance aside, some farmers will
receive better harvests than their neighbors because they were able to avoid field damage
from a natural disaster. Some items will always be fabricated “better” or “more beautifully”
and will be selected over an item of the same design. The absence of inequity does not equal
the presence of equity, though. As such, the best that can be done is to make inequities less
severe across as many categories as possible.
Other lessons can be drawn from this text that do not receive a direct mention here.
Given the lacunae that exist, and the current level of technological sophistication, many of
them are simply untreatable in the present. Hence why Section 4 urges the reader not to
consider this piece one that is “traditionally scientific” in nature and why such a statement
was given in the Introduction. Though it may not be desirable for a paper appearing
alongside others of a mathematical or legal tint to present a discussion in this manner,
it is the nature of philosophical works to leave room for interpretation. Insofar as the
logic of the argument “tracks”, the arguments should develop toward the conclusions and
assertions made. Should they not, it presents the reader an opportunity to understand how
their opinion differs from another or develop a work that is able to attack those flawed
aspects of this piece. The author’s hope is that many (if not all) of the same conclusions can
be reached by following the hypothesis and logic of the “methodology” of this essay. In
all, only time will reveal whether the hypothesis presented in this article is proven “true”
or “false.” Until that point, and even beyond, the greatest thing that can be achieved is a
field-wide shift to address some of the more pressing issues expounded upon herein.
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37. Kamiyama, K. Kōkaku Kidōtai Sutando Arōn Konpurekkusu (Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex); Production I.G.: Tokyo, Japan, 2002.
38. Wachowski, L.; Wachowski, L. The Matrix Reloaded; Warner Bros. Entertainment: Burbank, CA, USA, 2003.
39. Wachowski, L.; Wachowski, L. The Matrix Revolutions; Warner Bros. Entertainment: Burbank, CA, USA, 2003.
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Society); Production I.G.: Tokyo, Japan, 2006.
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